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INTRODUCTION 
The number of public corporations in the United States has been in 
decline for almost twenty years. Alternative forms of organization, from 
LLCs and benefit corporations to Linux and Wikipedia, provide robust 
competition to traditional corporations, while short-lived, project-based 
enterprises that assemble supply chains from available parts are increas-
ingly cost effective. Yet our understanding of corporate governance has 
not kept pace with the new organization of the economy and we continue 
to treat the public corporation with dispersed ownership as the default 
form of doing business. Meanwhile, many of the corporations going pub-
lic in recent years have abandoned traditional standards of corporate 
governance and give their founders extraordinary voting shares that ef-
fectively guarantee their control in perpetuity. The public corporation 
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seems to be an increasingly anachronistic form of enterprise in the Unit-
ed States.1 
Nikefication turned the corporation into a nexus-of-contracts, or-
ganizationally separating design from production and distribution.2 En-
trepreneurs grew skilled at assembling contractors into a virtual enter-
prise. More recently we have seen Uberization, which allows on-demand 
labor to be contracted by the task via online platforms. Uberization 
threatens to turn jobs into tasks, to the detriment of labor. Every input 
into the enterprise becomes possible to rent rather than to buy, and em-
ployee-free organizations are increasingly feasible. Enterprises increas-
ingly resemble a web page, a set of calls on resources that are assembled 
on demand to create a coherent performance. 
In Part I of this Article, I first summarize evidence on the declining 
number of public corporations in the United States and suggest that it is 
not regulations that are responsible but the changing nature of produc-
tion. I also summarize some of the atavistic governance practices of re-
cent IPOs and predict that they will not survive long. In Part II, I describe 
how Jensen and Meckling’s contentious 1976 article came to prominence 
and ultimately provided a rationale for Nikefication. In Part III, I de-
scribe how Uberization—making labor inputs available on demand—
removes one of the last remaining rationales for the corporation, and in-
dicates that it may usher in a new dark era for labor.  
I. THE VANISHING PUBLIC CORPORATION 
Public corporations have been vanishing in the United States since 
the turn of the twenty-first century. The number of American corpora-
tions listed on U.S. stock markets dropped by fifty-five percent between 
1997 and 2012.3 With about 4,000 companies left, American markets are 
at the lowest number of listings in decades, while India surpassed the 
United States in listings in 2003.4 In the past several years, we have seen 
the disappearance from the markets of corporations in nearly every in-
dustry, from electronics to retail to investment banking. Some of the de-
                                                      
 1. The arguments in this section are fully documented in GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING 
AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY (forthcoming May 
2016). 
 2. Nike pioneered a model of designing and marketing athletic shoes by contracting out pro-
duction to suppliers in East Asia. “Nikefication” describes the widespread adoption of this model. 
 3. See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV 1121, 1130–35 (2011). 
 4. World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators (for “Country”, select “India” or “United States” 
; then for “Series”, select “Listed domestic companies, total”) (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
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cline in numbers is due to industry consolidation, as in banking, but 
much is due to bankruptcies and liquidations (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, 
Lehman Brothers, Circuit City, Eastman Kodak) and “going private” 
transactions. Some eventually list their shares again on the stock market, 
but most do not. This is a long-term secular shift in the nature of corpo-
rate capitalism in the United States. 
The established corporations that remain are splitting up and buying 
back their own stock at an impressive rate. Announced split-ups in recent 
years include Hewlett-Packard’s plan to split in two; eBay’s divestiture 
of Skype and PayPal; Time Warner’s separation of its publishing, media, 
and cable businesses; Alcoa’s announced bifurcation; and GE’s whole-
sale abandonment of finance, once its largest source of profit.5 These 
companies and their peers have been buying back their shares in bulk. 
The 100 largest members of the S&P 500 bought back roughly $1 trillion 
of their own shares between 2008 and 2013.6 Due to share buybacks, 
IBM’s shares outstanding dropped from 2.3 billion in 1993 to 1.1 billion 
twenty years later; one commentator noted that at this rate, IBM will 
have no shares left by 2034.7 Presumably, these firms find shrinking their 
share bases to be a better investment than researching new products or 
investing in new plants and equipment. Perhaps they know something we 
do not. 
While the biggest corporations are disappearing, splitting up, and 
buying back shares, they are not being replaced by new entrants. The 
going public fad of the 1990s is now long gone. It has been almost twen-
ty years since the peak of the 1990s IPO wave, but there is no reason to 
expect a revival. There were fewer IPOs in the six years from 2009 to 
2014 than there were in 1996 alone.8 Although some in the venture capi-
tal community would blame the IPO drought since 2000 on                
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, or other manifestations of an intrusive 
                                                      
 5. See David Gelles, Breaking Up Is the New Thing to Do in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
6, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/breaking-up-is-the-new-thing-to-do/;  
Leslie Picker, Alcoa to Split Into 2 Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/business/dealbook/alcoa-to-split-into-2-separate-
companies.html; James B. Stewart, Do-It-All Era Ending as G.E. Returns to Core, N.Y. TIMES  
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/business/dealbook/do-it-all-era-ending-as-ge-
returns-to-core.html. 
 6. Dennis K. Berman, Does IBM Love or Hate Itself?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304027204579334081811064124. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: UPDATED STATISTICS (Aug. 26, 2015), 
available at https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2015/09/IPOs2014Statistics.pdf. 
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nanny state,9 they would be wrong. The number of listed companies be-
gan to decline several years before the dot-com collapse. Even the JOBS 
Act of 2012, which greatly reduced the regulatory hurdles for small firms 
going public, has had only a trivial impact on the number of IPOs.10 
So-called unicorns (companies privately valued at $1 billion or more) are 
staying private in spite of a booming market. Going public seems to have 
lost its appeal.11 
The few companies that are going public often ignore the most 
basic standards of corporate governance—such as one share/one vote—
and their long-term staying power is open to question. The eighty-four 
companies listed in Table 1 all went public since 2010 with dual-class 
voting rights that gave the founders great control relative to their finan-
cial stake in the company. Groupon, for instance, awarded its founders 
150 votes per share when it went public, while Zynga’s founder Marcus 
Pincus controls 70 votes per share.12 Under these circumstances, corpo-
rate control is effectively not contestable by outsiders or minority share-
holders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 9. Timothy B. Lee, The IPO Is Dying. Marc Andreessen Explains Why, VOX (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/6/26/5837638/the-ipo-is-dying-marc-andreessen-explains-why. 
 10. See, e.g., Michael Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew Gustafson, The JOBS Act and 
IPO Volume: Evidence that Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121 (2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459591. 
 11. See RITTER, supra note 8. 
 12. Randall Smith, One Share, One Vote?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052970203911804576653591322367506. 
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Ironwood Pharmaceuticals Inc. Groupon Constellium NV 
Crude Carriers Corp. Manning & Napier RCS Capital Corp. 
MaxLinear Inc. Zynga Coty Inc. 
First Interstate BancSystem Inc. Renewable Energy Group Truett-Hurst Inc. 
DynaVox Inc. Yelp Luxoft Holding Inc. 
PAA Natural Gas Storage LP Vantiv Silvercrest Asset Management 
S&W Seed Co. Digital Cinema Destinations Noodles & Co. 
Niska Gas Storage Partners LLC Edgen Group Inc. NRG Yield Inc. 
Oxford Resource Partners LP The Carlyle Group LP UCP Inc. 
Ameresco Inc. Tilly’s Inc. Jones Energy Inc. 
Green Dot Corp. Facebook Inc. Intrexon Corp. 
Chesapeake Midstream Ptrs. LP KAYAK Software Corp. Pattern Energy Group 
Rhino Resource Partners LP Globus Medical Inc. Premier Inc. 
Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Co. Manchester United PLC RingCentral 
FXCM Inc. Workday Inc. RE/MAX Holdings 
Swift Transportation Co. Seadrill Partners LLC LDR Holding 
Adecoagro SA The WhiteWave Foods Co. Veeva Systems 
MagnaChip Semiconductor Restoration Hardware Hldg Inc. JGWPT Holdings LLC 
Apollo Global Management PBF Energy Inc. Zulily 
GNC Holdings Zoetis Inc. AMC Entertainment Holdings 
TMS International Health Ins Innovations Inc. EP Energy Corp. 
Arcos Dorados Holdings Artisan Partners Asset Mgmt Inc. Malibu Boats 
Box Ships Inc. Taylor Morrison Home Corp. uniQure BV 
Air Lease Corp. Fairway Group Holdings Corp. Ladder Capital 
LinkedIn Corp. Blackhawk Network Holdings Inc. Lumenis Ltd. 
Yandex NV PennyMac Finl Svcs Inc. Castlight Health Inc. 
KiOR William Lyon Homes Inc. Phibro Animal Health Corp. 
Zillow Tableau Software Inc. Moelis & Co LLC 
 
Table 1: Firms going public with unequal voting rights since 201013 
 
Dual-class voting rights have a long history and some famous prac-
titioners, including Ford Motor Company (which went public in 1956 
with two classes of shares, one giving the Ford family forty percent of 
                                                      
 13. This table was created from data contained in the linked Excel spreadsheet at IPOs from 
1980 – April 2014 with Multiple Share Classes Outstanding, 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2015/06/dual-class-ipo.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).  
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the votes with only five percent of the shares) and Nike (which gives 
founder Philip Knight additional votes and guaranteed seats on the board 
of directors).14 But dual-class capitalization has traditionally been most 
common in the newspaper industry, where family-controlled businesses 
such as the New York Times and Dow Jones sought to avoid pressures 
from investors to trade journalistic integrity for profit. Since Google 
went public in 2003, giving the two founders and CEO Eric Schmidt an 
absolute majority of the voting rights, the practice has become common 
in Silicon Valley. 
Consider the IPO prospectus of Facebook, dated February 1, 2012. 
Under “Use of Proceeds,” it states: “[W]e do not currently have any spe-
cific uses of the net proceeds planned. . . . Pending other uses, we intend 
to invest the proceeds to us in investment-grade, interest-bearing securi-
ties . . . or hold as cash.”15 It later notes: 
Because we qualify as a “controlled company” under the corporate 
governance rules for publicly-listed companies, we are not required 
to have a majority of our board of directors be independent, nor are 
we required to have a compensation committee or an independent 
nominating function. In light of our status as a controlled company, 
our board of directors has determined not to have an independent 
nominating function and has chosen to have the full board of direc-
tors be directly responsible for nominating members of our board, 
and in the future we could elect not to have a majority of our board 
of directors be independent or not to have a compensation commit-
tee.16 
In short, one twenty-eight-year-old college dropout, holding an ab-
solute majority of the voting shares, would have ultimate control for the 
foreseeable future. He might, for instance, make $20 billion acquisitions 
without consulting the board of directors. 
It is somewhat surprising that after three decades of shareholder ac-
tivism and governance reform, startups in Silicon Valley—America’s 
hotbed of investor-fueled innovation—have chosen to abandon good 
governance en masse and to adopt shareholder-hostile voting structures. 
One possibility is that young technology firms are going into the markets 
wearing armor to protect themselves from Wall Street’s myopia so that 
they can make long-term investments and create jobs. But while the 
                                                      
 14. DAVIS, supra note 1. 
 15. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM S-1: REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR FACEBOOK, INC. 
34 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/ 
d287954ds1.htm. 
 16. Id. at 31. 
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“creative” part of creative destruction occasionally generates shareholder 
value (at this writing, Facebook is valued at roughly one-quarter trillion 
dollars, in spite of having revenues of only $12.5 billion in 2014),17 it 
almost never creates actual full-time employment. 
At this writing, the number of employees at ten of the most highly 
visible technology companies to go public since the Great Recession are 
modest, to say the least: Zynga (1,974 employees); LinkedIn (6,897); 
Groupon (3,525 in North America); Zillow (1,215); Yelp (2,711); Face-
book (9,199); Tableau (1,947); Zulilly (2,907); and Box (1,158) collec-
tively employed 31,533 persons.18 For comparison purposes, Circuit City 
fired roughly 34,000 employees when it was liquidated in January 
2009.19 Almost no one actually works at the companies that go public, 
and these firms hire relatively few new people each year, even at the be-
hemoths. Google adds roughly 5,000 net new jobs per year, Facebook 
about 1,200.20 (Notably, in 2013 only seven of Facebook’s 1,200 new 
hires were black, which points to another one of Silicon Valley’s is-
sues.)21 
The simplest explanation for the declining prevalence of public 
corporations is not regulation but transaction costs. In his 1937 article 
The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase noted that using free markets was 
not free. Coase wrote, “The main reason why it is profitable to establish 
a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. 
The most obvious cost of ‘organising’ production through the price 
mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.”22 When 
the cost of using the price mechanism goes down—for instance, because 
it is possible to find multiple bidders for many essential tasks on the 
Web; many of the tools of organizing are available free or cheap online; 
and labor can be “rented” through temps and contractors—then the 
tradeoffs that once favored corporations begin to tilt in favor of alterna-
tive ways of organizing, such as privately financed LLCs. 
                                                      
 17. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: FACEBOOK, INC. 32 (2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680115000006/fb-12312014x10k.htm. 
 18. Figures on employment from company 10-K filings available at EDGAR: Company Fil-
ings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2015). 
 19. Circuit City to Liquidate Remaining U.S. Stores, MSNBC (Jan. 16, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28691963/ns/business-us_business/. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Rupert Neate, Facebook Only Hired Seven Black People in Latest Diversity Count, 
GUARDIAN (June 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/25/facebook-
diversity-report-black-white-women-employees. 
 22. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937). 
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The public corporation, in short, may be reaching its twilight in the 
United States, a speculative point I initially made in a 2011 Seattle Uni-
versity Law Review article that now seems to be coming true.23 
II. NIKEFICATION AND THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS 
It is worth detailing why the public corporation is in decline in the 
United States. I would start with a forty-year-old article that helped 
change the discourse about what the corporation was, from a social insti-
tution to a mere nexus-of-contracts. Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, is one of the most widely cited publications in economics in 
the past half-century.24 Google Scholar attributes over 50,000 citations to 
this piece, putting it at the top of the field. Yet it is largely unread by 
economists outside of finance. Why is that? 
This new theory of the firm was counterintuitive, contentious, and 
massively influential among law and business scholars. But there is 
something odd about a finance-based approach becoming dominant as a 
“theory of the firm.” Anyone who has taken introductory microeconom-
ics might surmise that the most important question about firms is how 
they set prices and volumes. Industrial economists might argue that mar-
ket share and market power were important for consumer welfare. Labor 
economists might imagine that firms’ roles as employers merited some 
interest. 
The idea that the most important thing about a firm is how stock 
ownership by its managers aligns incentives with share price is surpris-
ing, to put it mildly. Only a tiny proportion of companies list on stock 
markets, and only a small fraction of those (mostly in the United States) 
have dispersed ownership. This was a theory about something that al-
most never happened in nature. A theory of family life would not want to 
start with the Kardashians; why would a theory of the firm start with 
managerialist American corporations? Moreover, how is it that a pair of 
financial economists at the University of Rochester business school, writ-
ing in Volume 3 of an anonymous journal published by the University of 
Rochester business school—which was edited by one of the authors!—
managed to create a dominant paradigm for the corporation for the next 
thirty years? It was as if a self-published novel won its author the Nobel 
Prize. 
                                                      
 23. See Davis, supra note 3. 
 24. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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One might argue that Jensen and Meckling’s influence derived not 
from creating a well-specified, falsifiable, broadly applicable empirical 
theory, but because they provided a quasi-scientific rationale for de-
institutionalizing the corporation. For decades, scholars had argued about 
the social responsibilities of corporations and likened them to nation-
states with relatively inviolable boundaries. Corporate managers had to 
trade off the interests of various “stakeholders,” and shareholders were 
only one constituency among many. Jensen and Meckling argued that 
this was wrong on both counts. The corporation was nothing but a nexus-
of-contracts that existed to create shareholder value: 
It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply 
legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting rela-
tionships among individuals. 
 . . . Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distin-
guish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organiza-
tion) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very re-
al sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) 
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, materi-
al and capital inputs and the consumers of output.25 
A firm is like a market and should not be confused with an actor 
having goals, motivations, or personality. Through a puff of logical 
smoke, the traditional view of the corporation dissipates, and questions 
that animated some theorists (such as where a firm should place its 
boundaries) disappear (firms don’t have boundaries—next question). We 
could now get down to the business of reorganizing the corporate sector 
to create shareholder value, guided by efficient capital markets. 
Jensen and Meckling’s most enduring contribution is their meta-
phor of the corporation as a mere nexus-of-contracts. At the time that 
they wrote, this idea was preposterous. General Motors and AT&T had 
almost one million employees each, with seasoned workforces laboring 
in vast and highly tangible facilities. Corporations were quite obviously 
social institutions, and their employees were like citizens who received 
health care for themselves and their dependents, stable compensation, 
and pensions upon retirement. Denying that GM was a social institution 
was like denying that Canada was a country. But the “nexus” imagery 
served as a useful provocation, a lever to bust up the unwieldy and 
shareholder-hostile conglomerates built up over the prior decades. This 
was a theory perfectly designed to legitimate a bust-up takeover wave. 
                                                      
 25. Id. at 310–11 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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Most large corporations had grown diversified during the 1960s and 
1970s, sometimes operating in dozens of unrelated industries (e.g., ITT, 
LTV, Gulf & Western). Such firms were systematically undervalued by 
the stock market compared to more focused firms, yet their status as so-
cial institutions protected them from being reorganized by outside buy-
ers. Tearing apart a social institution hardly sounds like a “tender offer” 
at all. Shifting a few contractual ties, on the other hand, seems harmless. 
After the Supreme Court’s Edgar v. MITE Corp. decision in 1982 
struck down state-level antitakeover laws,26 and the Justice Department 
relaxed its stance on intra-industry mergers, the conglomerate’s days 
were numbered. Twenty-eight percent of the Fortune 500 received take-
over bids in the 1980s, and these battles for control were generally suc-
cessful at splitting up diversified firms.27 Those that were not taken over 
often voluntarily restructured, leaving American industry far more indus-
trially focused by 1990.28 Moreover, corporate boundaries were no long-
er sacrosanct, and a consensus was emerging that corporations existed 
primarily to create shareholder value. 
The nexus metaphor became ever more apt during the 1990s, when 
the advent of the Web made it easier to outsource on a grand scale. At 
first, firms contracted out peripheral activities like managing the payroll. 
Later, even the most central aspects of the business were eligible for out-
sourcing. China’s growth as a manufacturing powerhouse made it feasi-
ble to outsource many of the lower-value-added tasks of production. 
Outsourcing firms ultimately came to encompass full-scale assembly and 
supplier management. The Web made the make-or-buy decision subject 
to continuous revision because prices were readily available. In combina-
tion, access to competing vendors in China and elsewhere over the Web 
made outsourcing irresistible for many corporations. 
The ability to create an enterprise out of already-existing parts, 
without having to build them from scratch, enabled a disintegrated form 
of organization. Nike had demonstrated that design and production could 
be organizationally separated. The company doing the designing and 
marketing could be in Oregon, while other companies in China or Indo-
nesia or Vietnam could handle manufacturing, and still other companies 
could manage distribution. This was “Nikefication,” a new model of 
post-industrial organization. And if it worked for sneakers, why not 
                                                      
 26. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 27. See Gerald F. Davis, Kristina A. Diekmann & Catherine H. Tinsley, The Decline and Fall 
of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 
AM. SOC. REV. 547, 548 (1994). 
 28. Id. at 562. 
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computers, or blood thinner, or “enhanced interrogations” of prisoners in 
Iraq? 
In the intervening years, Nikefication has become pervasive. Al-
most the entire electronics industry was outsourced during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, as U.S. employment in computers and electronics de-
clined by forty percent.29 As practices of outsourcing became widely 
adopted, corporations came to look more and more like the nexus-of-
contracts described by the financial economists, with the parts snapped 
together on a temporary basis like interlocking plastic blocks. The ready 
availability of outside contractors made hiring actual employees largely 
unnecessary and enabled the contemporary Silicon Valley model. 
III. FROM NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS TO THE WEB PAGE ENTERPRISE 
Widespread Nikefication has led to a vast reshuffling of organiza-
tional and industrial boundaries in the United States. Surprisingly few 
things that Americans buy today are actually produced by the company 
that manages the brand. Moreover, advances in computing power and 
telecommunications have radically reorganized work processes inside 
organizations. Tasks that are not currently outsourced can be controlled 
by algorithms and “workforce management systems,” which have been 
widely implemented across the retail, wholesale, and food service sec-
tors. Today’s shopping malls and chain restaurants are high-tech succes-
sors to the assembly line, with GPS-enabled time-and-motion studies 
optimizing human capital deployment at every moment. Line manage-
ment is unnecessary when the performance of every worker at every 
store at every moment is available to headquarters staff back at the Pan-
opticon. Drones at HQ can push messages to your terminal or headset to 
let you know that you are not scanning SKUs fast enough; you failed to 
upsell that customer on the silk scarf; your last table gave you only three 
smiley faces on their embedded iPad; or you are only grabbing seventy 
items per hour at the warehouse temp job when your quota is 110. 
We have turned the tasks of organization design and management 
over to programmers. Hiring, scheduling, performance measurement, and 
evaluation are now largely in the hands of algorithms written by people 
who may have no personal experience of the jobs they are designing. 
Things are about to get worse, at least from the perspective of labor. 
The next stage in this evolution after Nikefication is Uberization: renting 
labor for specific tasks rather than hiring for jobs. Business authors in the 
1990s published many tomes on the “death of the career,” arguing that 
                                                      
 29. Gerald F. Davis, After the Corporation, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 283, 288 fig.1 (2013). 
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companies no longer valued long-term employment and that smart work-
ers were perpetual free agents, always on the prowl for the next oppor-
tunity. The job had replaced the career. Jobs were always temporary, 
even if they were not labeled that way explicitly. 
But now the task may be replacing the job. “Job” implies an em-
ployer (often a corporation) and an employee. But platforms like Uber, 
TaskRabbitt, and countless other “sharing economy” apps provide a 
means to contract for specific tasks rather than hiring for jobs. Thanks to 
ubiquitous smartphones, it is now possible to create markets (and there-
fore to discover prices) for all kinds of human tasks on all kinds of 
schedules. Not all markets require prices—think Tinder and Grindr—but 
at the moment, almost anything that can be provided by another human 
being has an app for it operating in the Bay Area. This is the “gig econ-
omy,” or the “on-demand economy,” or the “TaskRabbit economy.”30 A 
better term that remains agnostic about what is being provided via these 
impromptu markets is platform capitalism, where platforms enable trans-
actions. 
Uberization renders the corporate employment relation increasingly 
dispensable. Why do companies hire people in the first place? One ra-
tionale is that work requirements cannot always be specified in advance, 
and so it pays to have employees on hand who are willing to do a broad 
range of tasks more or less on demand. But this often requires firms to be 
fully staffed even if the expected demand is not realized. The company 
has to pay employees even if it doesn’t have anything for them to do, 
which is an abomination for profit-driven firms. Recently, food service 
and retail firms have been under fire for their erratic scheduling practices 
that call in hourly employees for shifts and then send them home early if 
there is not sufficient demand, or require them to be available for shifts 
even though they might not get called in at all.31 The risk of variable 
compensation week to week is borne by the employee, not the firm, and 
is one of the common grievances of low-wage workers. Uber, in contrast, 
does not have shifts. Its driver-partners are not required to work at any 
                                                      
 30. Robert Kuttner, The Task Rabbit Economy, AM. PROSPECT, Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 46, availa-
ble at http://prospect.org/article/task-rabbit-economy. 
 31. Jodi Kantor, Working Anything but 9 to 5, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/starbucks-workers-scheduling-hours.html; Noam 
Scheiber, The Perils of Ever-Changing Work Schedules Extend to Children’s Well-Being, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/business/economy/the-perils-of-ever-
changing-work-schedules-extend-to-childrens-well-being.html; Noam Scheiber, Starbucks Falls 
Short After Pledging Better Labor Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/business/starbucks-falls-short-after-pledging-better-labor-
practices.html. 
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particular time. They log in to the app on their phone and hang out an 
electronic shingle. If an opportunity comes along, they can take it (and 
get paid); if not, no one is to blame. If demand is expected to be high, as 
on New Year’s Eve or when it is raining, they can receive surge pricing. 
Pay is by the task, and there are no guarantees. 
Now imagine an Ayn Rand world in which the employment relation 
is on a “buyer beware” basis. Walmart or other employers could offer 
training and certification for particular fungible tasks (cashier, shelf 
stocker, greeter, returns clerk) and, using the hypothetical Walmart 
YouServe app, recruit for the day or the hour as needed for each task. 
Self-employed “quasi-associates” could log on to the app and bid on 
shifts available at stores within a commutable distance for their certifica-
tions. If demand was high, the app might implement surge pricing; if not, 
the quasi-associates might compete against each other to offer the low 
price, everyday. Now, the hapless precariat has been transformed into a 
nation of microentrepreneurs, seizing control of their own schedule and 
charting their own destiny. Codependent no more! 
The architecture for this enterprise of the future is already in place. 
It is the enterprise as web page, in which the “firm” is a set of calls on 
resources that are then assembled into a performance. Next time you are 
on a web page, right-click and view the underlying source code. You will 
see that what appears as a coherent design on your browser is actually 
produced by a set of calls to various SQL databases and other sources. 
The page you see does not exist until you call it into being. This may 
sound abstract, but some familiar businesses already operate this way. 
When Circuit City was liquidated in 2009 and its 34,000 remaining em-
ployees shown the door, a Long Island company bought the brand name, 
logo, and web domain and connected it to an essentially automated order 
fulfillment system.32 On the Web, it looked the same as it always did, but 
behind the scenes in the physical world Circuit City was no more. Like a 
hermit crab inhabiting a discarded shell, the new enterprise did what Cir-
cuit City did, without tangible real estate or human employees. The web 
page was the enterprise. 
Essential components of an enterprise have been available online 
for years, but labor represents something different. It is possible to incor-
porate online,33 raise funds,34 hire programmers and other professionals,35 
                                                      
 32. MSNBC, supra note 19; Miguel Bustillo, Web Breathes New Life Into Failed Retailers, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040590045751277 
31650688968. 
 33. See, e.g., LIBERIAN CORPORATE REGISTRY, http://liberiancorporations.com/about-the-
registry/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
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locate manufacturers36 and distributors,37 and almost any other task. Di-
rect in-person labor was the one component of the enterprise that was 
hard to make appear on demand. Thanks to Uberization, that is now pos-
sible. Like dockworkers on the waterfronts of old, or impromptu work 
crews assembled in Home Depot parking lots at dawn, we now face the 
prospect of a smartphone-enabled precariat scrambling for shifts on a 
daily basis. 
Moreover, as Oliver Williamson might have predicted, it is not the 
level of skill but the firm-specificity of the skill that is likely to deter-
mine which jobs remain with employers and which become Uberized 
tasks. Physicians are already doing on demand consults online during 
their spare hours, including prescribing medicines.38 How much of what 
a firm does could not be done by contractors in a pinch? How will organ-
ization design change so as to de-specify tasks and render them amenable 
to Uberization? 
CONCLUSION 
Platform capitalism has received a great deal of attention in the 
popular press and some in the academic literature. Here, I simply point 
out its implications for the corporation. Put most simply, platforms great-
ly reduce the cost of using the price system, which was Coase’s rationale 
for the firm in the first place. If long-lived investments are unnecessary 
to do what a firm does because the inputs to production—including la-
bor—can be rented on an ad hoc basis, then corporations will not be the 
most cost-effective way to organize. This may help explain the declining 
number of public corporations in the United States: the American econ-
omy is in the vanguard of implementing the “web page enterprise,” 
which makes the corporation increasingly unnecessary. 
We are used to talking about a world with “corporations” and “em-
ployees,” but that time is coming to a close. Our categories for appre-
hending the world do not map onto the world we encounter today. The 
firm transformed from a social institution to a nexus-of-contracts, and is 
now increasingly moving toward a web page enterprise. We may be at a 
                                                                                                                         
 34. See, e.g., INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
 35. See, e.g., UPWORK, https://www.upwork.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
 36. See, e.g., ALIBABA, http://www.alibaba.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
 37. See, e.g., SHIPWIRE, http://www.shipwire.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
 38. Abby Goodnough, Modern Doctors’ House Calls: Skype Chat and Fast Diagnosis, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/health/modern-doctors-house-calls-
skype-chat-and-fast-diagnosis.html. 
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point where traditional theories of corporate governance are more hin-
drance than help. 
 
